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"HOW DO YOU TAKE YOUR MULTI-STATE,
CLASS-ACTION LITIGATION? ONE LUMP OR
TWO?" INFUSING STATE CLASS-ACTION
JURISPRUDENCE INTO FEDERAL, MULTI-




The Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 (CAFA) arguably
created more problems than it solved.2 By federalizing
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securities-fraud litigation and manages Goldman Scarlato & Karon, P.C.'s
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (LexisNexis 2005).
2. For example, by way of unintended consequences, federal court antitrust
filings have already begun to increase because price-fixed products' indirect
purchasers can't bring lawsuits under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), for
violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), yet can make claims under
certain states' antitrust or consumer-fraud statutes, see Daniel R. Karon, "Tour
Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!" The National Movement Toward
Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2004) (arguing that "thirty-nine (and arguably as
many as forty-four) states grant indirect purchasers standing, either on their
own or through their attorneys general as parens patriae, to pursue price fixing
claims"), and common law. See Daniel R. Karon, Undoing the Otherwise Perfect
Crime-Applying Unjust Enrichment to Consumer Price-Fixing Claims, 108 W.
VA. L. REV. 395, 405 (2005) (arguing that, in all states, "unjust enrichment [is]
an entirely viable, yet often underutilized, theory for pursuing consumer price-
fixing claims"). Indirect purchasers typically filed claims in state court, where
only complete diversity jurisdiction existed as defendants' basis for removal to
federal court. But CAFA only requires minimal diversity and permits
defendants to aggregate damages. See infra Part II. Therefore, antitrust
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essentially all interstate class-action lawsuits,3  CAFA
introduced multiple substantive, jurisdictional, and other
theoretical challenges that the bench and bar will need to
work through together, hopefully to sensible resolutions. One
of these challenges concerns whether federal judges may rely
on years of state class-action jurisprudence to decide class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 when
considering multi-state, class-action lawsuits alleging a single
state law's substantive application.
Before CAFA, federal courts conducted multi-state,
substantive-law analyses infrequently. CAFA has changed
this situation markedly, and denying federal courts the
ability to invoke years of well-developed, state-court
jurisprudence forces them to decide multi-state class
certification alleging a single state law's substantive
application from a somewhat blank legal slate. But even
though federal courts regularly apply state substantive law in
litigation that would have remained in state court pre-CAFA must now be filed
in federal court.
Also, where "two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State
in which the action was originally filed," 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B), the federal
court must decline jurisdiction. But to properly rebut this threshold, a
defendant must prove that the majority of the class is outside the state, which
requires an empirical class analysis, such as defendant producing its customer
lists pre-class certification-not a welcome undertaking for any defendant.
Finally, "[ilf a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a
recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney's fee award to
class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on
the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed." 28 U.S.C. §
1712(a). Accordingly, plaintiffs' counsel have already become, naturally, less
inclined to resolve class-action lawsuits for coupons and have instead begun
insisting on money damages-a result that defendants, while believing
favorable during the pre-CAFA debate, have, in some situations, begun to
regret.
3. According to CAFA:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in
which-
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or
subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A)-(C).
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diversity cases,4 this particular state-law issue is curious in
that it involves a procedural overlay-Federal Rule 23-that
affects federal courts' traditional ability to invoke state
substantive law and to conduct multi-state, class-certification
analyses.
After describing the recently enacted Class Action
Fairness Act and the way it fundamentally changed
traditional, interstate class-action subject-matter
jurisdictional conventions,5 this Article will explain the
choice-of-law conundrum that CAFA created.6 It will next
demonstrate why state choice-of-law jurisprudence, taken
alone, insufficiently resolves this predicament7 and will then
describe why the U.S. Supreme Court's Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins' and its progeny9 become critical to this newly
required jurisdictional analysis.1 ° Finally, it will conclude,
despite the admitted, if not predominant, procedural nature
of a Federal Rule 23 class-certification analysis, that
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court doctrine-albeit never
intended to be so invoked-federal courts may draw upon
state-law decisions alleging a single state law's substantive
application when deciding multi-state class certification
under Federal Rule 23.
II. CAFA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRADITIONAL, INTERSTATE
CLASS-ACTION SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
CAFA fundamentally changed federal subject-matter
jurisdictional doctrine as it relates to class-action claims
based on diversity jurisdiction." Before CAFA amended 28
4. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State.").
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965).
10. See discussion infra Part V.
11. Before CAFA, federal courts determined subject-matter jurisdiction over
class-action claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (LexisNexis 2005):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
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U.S.C. § 1332-the federal diversity-jurisdiction statute-to
create federal jurisdiction for claims involving minimal
diversity 12 and amounts in controversy that, individually,
total less than $75,000,'1 federal courts were not permitted to
aggregate class members' claims to establish the
jurisdictional minimum.
In Snyder v. Harris,4 a class-action shareholder lawsuit
and the seminal case concerning non-aggregation," the U.S.
Supreme Court explained that "[wihen two or more plaintiffs,
having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience
and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand
of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount." 6 The
Snyder Court based its ruling on two considerations. First,
the Court sensed that a contrary holding would wreak havoc
on the federal judiciary's workload. 7 Second, it believed that
Congress had come to rely on the Court's interpretation in
continually re-enacting § 1332's amount-in-controversy
threshold."1
Harkening back to Snyder, the Court in Zahn v.
International Paper Co.," 9 later elucidated that "class actions
involving plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims were
subject to the usual rule that a federal district court can
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title [28 U.S.C. §
1603(a)], as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
13. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(C).
14. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
15. Id. at 333 ("[Plaintifll brought suit against members of the company's
board of directors alleging that they had sold their shares of the company's
stock for an amount far in excess of its fair market value, [and] that this excess
represented [an illegal] payment to these particular directors").
16. Id. at 336 (citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40
(1911)).
17. Id. at 340 ("The expansion of the federal caseload could be most
noticeable in class actions brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship.").
18. Id. at 339 ("To overrule the aggregation doctrine at this late date would
run counter to the congressional purpose in steadily increasing through the
years the jurisdictional amount requirement."). See also Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) ("[W]e have no good reason to disagree with ... the
historic construction of the jurisdictional statutes left undisturbed by Congress
over these many years.").
19. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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assume jurisdiction over only those plaintiffs presenting
claims exceeding the $10,00021 minimum specified in § 1332
[, and that aiggregation of claims was impermissible."21
Instead, "[elach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must
satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does
not must be dismissed from the case .... ",22 And while the
Zahn Court never expressly mentioned supplemental
jurisdiction (or its antecedents, pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction), the Court's language also effectively precluded
district courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over
class members with (at least arguably) less than $75,000 in
damages.23  Accordingly, district courts could not
automatically consider absent class members' claims even if
the named plaintiffs' claimed that damages satisfied the
minimum jurisdictional requirement.24
20. On May 18, 1989, Congress amended § 1332's jurisdictional-minimum
requirement from $10,000 to $50,000, and on January 17, 1997, amended it
from $50,000 to $75,000.
21. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299.
22. Id. at 301. Interestingly, though, the Court excused unnamed plaintiffs
from satisfying § 1332's "diversity of citizenship" requirement. See Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) ("The intervention of the
Indiana citizens in the [class-action] suit [against defendants who were Indiana
citizens] would not have defeated the [district court's diversity] jurisdiction.").
The Court never explained why it treated § 1332's diversity-of-citizenship and
amount-in-controversy requirements differently, other than to suggest that
allowing unnamed plaintiffs to evade both requirements would open the federal
litigation floodgates-a result the federal courts surely wanted to avoid but
must now face. See also Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340 ("[T]o allow aggregation of
claims where only one member of the entire class is of diverse citizenship could
transfer into the federal courts numerous local controversies involving
exclusively questions of state law.").
23. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300 ("Any plaintiff without the jurisdictional
amount must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege
jurisdictionally sufficient claims.").
24. According to some federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), which
Congress enacted in 1990 and which provides that "the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,"
id. § 1367(a), "overruled the Supreme Court's opinion in Zahn and required
district courts to aggregate the claims of class members to calculate the amount
in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction .... ." Dawalt v. Purdue
Pharm. L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2005). See also State Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 391 F.3d 577, 580 n.15 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he force of the argument that
§ 1367 overrules Zahn is untouched by the presence of multiple defendants
unless we adopt the illogical (indeed, absurd) conclusion that § 1367 overrules
Zahn only in single defendant cases."); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-
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But believing, due to Snyder and Zahn's non-aggregation
rule, that "[cilass-actions [were long being] manipulated for
personal gain,"25 and that "[1]awyers who represent plaintiffs
from multiple states [were] shop[ping] around for the state
court where they expect[ed] to win the most money, "26 on
February 10, 2005, Congress passed CAFA, and on February
18, 2005, President Bush signed it into law. CAFA amended
§ 1332 and abrogated Zahn, thus creating original federal-
court jurisdiction for class-action claims that exceed
$5,000,000 in potential aggregate damages. 27  Accordingly,
15 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[S]ince the pendent claims of the absent class members
raise similar questions of law and fact to [plaintiffs] claim, they are necessarily
a 'part of the same case or controversy.' Therefore, the district court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims [pursuant to
§ 1367(a)]."); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("If § 1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets the
jurisdictional amount but not the diversity requirement, it also allows suit by a
pendent plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the
jurisdictional amount."); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995)
("The statute's first section vests federal courts with the power to hear
supplemental claims generally, subject to limited exceptions set forth in the
statute's second section. Class actions are not among the enumerated
exceptions."). Other courts, as described, believed that § 1367 did not overrule
Zahn and that § 1332's requirement that all class members' claims meet the
jurisdictional minimum remained the rule. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232
F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Congress in § 1367(a) expressly excepted claims
brought under § 1332 and its well-understood definition of 'matter in
controversy."'); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218
(3d Cir. 1998) ([The claims of those plaintiffs who fail to meet the amount in
controversy must be remanded."); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640
(10th Cir. 1998) ("Congress in § 1367(a) expressly excepted claims brought
under § 1332 and its well-understood definition of 'matter in controversy."').
The Supreme Court, albeit after CAFA's enactment, ultimately confirmed that
§ 1367 overruled Zahn and that "interpreting § 1367 to foreclose supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in diversity cases who [did] not meet the minimum
amount in controversy [was] inconsistent with the text, read in light of other
statutory provisions and our established jurisprudence." Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005).
25. Press Release, The White House, President Signs Class-Action Fairness
Act of 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050218-
11.html (last visited June 18, 2006).
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2005). See also Exxon, 125 S. Ct.
at 2627-28 ("[CAFA] abrogates the rule against aggregating claims, a rule this
Court recognized in Ben-Hur and reaffirmed in Zahn."). While CAFA also
makes clear that, to satisfy § 1332's diversity requirement, only "minimal
diversity is required," meaning that only one class member need be a citizen of a
different state from any defendant, even pre-CAFA it was "well-settled that a
class action may satisfy § 1332 if there [was] diversity only between the
representative plaintiffs and the defendants." United States ex rel. Sero v.
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plaintiffs can no longer pursue multi-state, class-action cases
in state courts-assuming their claims involve any
meaningful class-wide damages (i.e., over $5,000,000)-but
must instead file in federal court. In this manner, at least as
contemplated by President Bush and Congress, class-action
defendants will be treated more fairly; although, not
surprisingly, debate raged, and still does, concerning this
beliefs soundness and CAFA's fairness.2" But regardless of
Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1129 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Ben Hur, 255 U.S. at 366). In
this manner, CAFA's new "minimum diversity" requirement does not greatly
impact the federal-jurisdictional analysis since minimum diversity had
effectively been the standard beforehand.
28. Fierce public debate preceded CAFA's enactment, with numerous public
officials and consumer groups voicing strident opposition. According to Nancy
Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, "[CAFA], which discourages class action
lawsuits, is far from fair. It is instead another way for Republicans to align
themselves with special interests at the expense of American consumers and the
justice system." Email from the People Over Profits Action Network containing
a message from House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 4, 2005) (on file
with author). Speaker Pelosi added her belief that "Republicans [were] bringing
to the floor ... a payback to big business at the expense of consumers[, and that
tihe Republican agenda is to ensure that some Americans do not get their day in
court." Id. Considering that "federal courts are already overwhelmed by the
large number of criminal drug cases and immigration case [and] do not have the
resources to handle complex issues of state law," Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am.
(ATLA), Don't Let Class Action "Reform" Deny Justice to Consumers, Mar. 7,
2002, http://www.atla.org/private/factsheets/classaction/CA deny.pdf (last
visited July 31, 2006), in 2003 Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the Judicial
Conference of the United States sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee
expressing their concerns about CAFA and reiterating their opposition to many
of its jurisdictional provisions, ATLA, Federal Judicial Conference Opposes
Federalizing Class Actions, http://www.atla.orghomepage/jc.aspx (last visited
Feb. 4, 2005) (on file with author), explaining that CAFA "would add
substantially to the work load of the federal courts and is inconsistent with
principles of federalism." NACA, What the Experts are Saying About the So-
Called 'Class Action Fairness Act" (on file with author). The Conference of
Chief Justices, which represents the interests of state supreme courts, also
"came out against the class action 'reform' legislation," ATLA Press Room,
Conference of Chief Justices Weighs Against Class Action "Reform" Legislation,
http://www.atla.orghomepage/ccj.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (on file with
author), explaining that they saw "no hard evidence of the inability of state
judicial systems to hear and decide fairly class actions brought in state courts,"
and expressing their belief that "state courts and state legislatures should be
responsible for correcting any problems (with class actions), and history has
shown that will occur." NACA, What the Experts are Saying About the So-
Called 'Class Action Fairness Act" (on file with author). Multiple consumer
groups also went on record in opposition to CAFA's enactment, such as the
ACLU, AFL-CIO, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer Law Center,
574 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 46
this debate's eventual outcome, CAFA effectively ended the
days of filing multi-state, class-action lawsuits in state courts.
III. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM CAFA CREATED
Having explained CAFA's contours and how it
fundamentally changed federal-diversity jurisdiction, an
example will help elucidate the substantive-
procedural/choice-of-law issue that CAFA inadvertently
created. In the pre-CAFA (or "de-CAFA-nated") world,
plaintiffs routinely filed multi-state, class-action cases in
state courts.29 Plaintiffs based this practice on the U.S.
NOW Legal Defense Fund, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and United
Steelworkers of America. See ATLA Press Room, Public Interest Organizations
Support Access to Justice-With Federal Courts Clogged, Class Actions Will Die,
http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/pessroom/FACTS/classact
ions/CoalitionforJustice (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (on file with author). Even
the Los Angeles Times commented that "[wihen corporate executives gush over
any bill with the word 'fairness' in its title, consumers had best check their
wallets,"A Failure of Fairness, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2005. The New York Times
observed that CAFA "would move almost all major class-action lawsuits to
overburdened federal courts from state courts [and that s]uch a shift is likely to
delay or deny justice in numerous instances, and, ultimately, to dilute the
impact of the strong consumer protection laws in many states." Paul Krugman,
Class-Action Unfairness, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at A26.
29. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 661 (Tex.
2004) (nationwide class action "alleg[ing] that the affected computers, some
thirty-seven models of Compaq Presario computers, contain defective FDCs,
which control the transfer of data . . .between a computer's memory and a
floppy disk"); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1102 (Ill. 1998)
(nationwide class action by "thousands of people who purchased Ford
automobiles [and] sustained property damage as a result of collisions which
occurred when the vehicles' transmissions shifted from 'park' to 'reverse'
without warning"); Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E.2d 620, 621 (Ill.
1997) (nationwide class action alleging that "defendants violated Illinois agency
and/or contract law when they failed to remit to plaintiffs order flow payments
received in executing plaintiffs' securities transactions"); Connick v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 583, 598 (Ill. 1996) (nationwide class action alleging "that
a defect in the Samurai's design caused all of the vehicles to roll over during
turns or evasive maneuvers"); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d
1071, 1075 (Cal. 2001) (nationwide class-action where defendant bank was
alleged to have "victimized its borrowers by systematically overcharging for the
replacement insurance coverage and secretly profiting through cash
commissions or in-kind services from the vendors of the replacement
insurance"); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456, 457 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005), rev'd as to whether Federal Arbitration Act preempted California
law concerning unconscionability of class-action waivers and class-wide
arbitration, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 2005) ("[Nlationwide class action against
Discover Bank . . .alleging claims for breach of contract and violation of the
Delaware Consumer Fraud Act."); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738
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Supreme Court's Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts ° decision,
which plaintiffs regularly cite for the proposition that a court
(formerly a state court) can certify a multi-state class action
under a single state's substantive law.
Shutts involved gas royalty owners' claims against
Philips Petroleum for delaying royalty payments.3 1 The
royalty owners resided in all fifty states,32 but three of them,
including Shutts, filed a class-action lawsuit in Kansas,
where Shutts lived, alleging that Phillips had violated
Kansas contract and equity law.33 Plaintiffs argued that
Kansas substantive law governed the entire class's claims
"notwithstanding that over 99% of the gas leases and some
97% of the plaintiffs . . .had no apparent connection to the
State of Kansas except for th[e] lawsuit."34 Although Phillips
argued that "the trial court should have looked to the laws of
each State where the leases were located to determine, on the
basis of conflict of laws principles, whether interest on the
suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what rate,"35 the
Kansas Supreme Court "stated that generally the law of the
forum controlled all claims unless 'compelling reasons' existed
to apply a different law."36 Finding no compelling reasons, it
affirmed the trial court's decision applying Kansas
substantive law to the entire class's claims.
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Phillips argued
that applying Kansas substantive law "violated the
constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (nationwide class action "assert[ing] that
[cruise line held] out [certain] charges as being wholly due to the ports, but then
[kept] the money that [was] in excess of the actual port charges"); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 434, 438 (2003)
(nationwide class action by "[a] group of policyholders [who] contend[ed] that
the insurance company's board of directors did not pay the dividends it
promised"); Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 839 A.2d 942, 948-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003) (nationwide class action against camera manufacturer for allegedly
misrepresenting certain camera's features).
30. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
31. Id. at 799.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 800.
34. Id. at 814-15.
35. Id. at 802-03.
36. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 803.
37. Id. at 803,816.
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Full Faith and Credit Clause."3  Drawing upon its earlier
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague3" decision, which also
involved a choice-of-law determination, 0 the Court explained
that "in many situations a state court may be free to apply
one of several choices of law."' The Court ruled that doing so
in a class-action setting is appropriate so long as the law
sought to be applied "is not in conflict with that of any other
jurisdiction connected to th[e] suit."42 If a conflict exists, the
state whose law plaintiff seeks to apply "must have a
'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to
the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class...
'creating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of
[one state's] law is not arbitrary or unfair."43  Considering
Kansas's "lack of 'interest' in claims unrelated to [Kansas, as
well as] the substantive conflict with jurisdictions such as
Texas,"" the Court concluded that the "application of Kansas
law to every claim in [the] case [was] sufficiently arbitrary
and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits"45 and the Court
refused to apply Kansas substantive law to the multi-state
class members' claims.4"
38. Id. at 816.
39. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
40. In Hague, decedent, a motorcycle passenger, was killed in an automobile
accident in Wisconsin. Id. at 305. Although decedent worked in Minnesota, he,
the motorcycle operator, and the other driver lived in Wisconsin, as did
decedent's wife. Id. While neither the motorcycle operator nor the other driver
held valid insurance, decedent held an Allstate policy covering his three
automobiles. Id. Decedent's policy contained an uninsured motorist clause
insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists
that limited coverage to $15,000 for each automobile. Id. Following the
accident, decedent's wife relocated to Minnesota, married a Minnesota resident,
and decedent's estate filed suit in Minnesota seeking to stack the policy's
uninsured motorist coverage, which Minnesota law permitted but Wisconsin
law did not. Id. Affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to apply
Minnesota's stacking law to decedent's estate's claim, the Court ruled that
"Minnesota had a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the
occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law was neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 320. Accordingly, the Court
believed "the choice of Minnesota law by the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Id.
41. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823.
42. Id. at 816.
43. Id. at 821 (citing Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13).
44. Id. at 822.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 823 ("We . . . reverse [the Kansas Supreme Court's] judgment
insofar as it held that Kansas law was applicable to all of the transactions
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Given Shutts's teachings, a hypothetical best
demonstrates how Shutts affected multi-state, class-action
lawsuits. If a plaintiff, pre-CAFA, filed a multi-state, class-
action lawsuit against, for example, an Ohio corporation in
Ohio state court for breach of contract, plaintiffs theory for
countering defendant's "predominance" argument 7 during
the class-certification stage and obtaining nationwide class
certification would be that, under Shutts's first prong, Ohio's
contract law does not conflict with any other state's contract
law; therefore, Ohio law applies to class members located in
multiple states.4" On the other hand, if plaintiffs lawsuit
alleged that defendant had violated Ohio's Consumer-
Protection Act,49  plaintiffs response to defendant's
which it sought to adjudicate.").
47. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), when alleging a
class-action claim for money damages, one of the multiple requirements that a
plaintiff must prove to obtain class certification is that "the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members." (emphasis added). Generally referred to as
Rule 23's "predominance requirement," "[tihe Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation." Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623
(1997). As a practical matter, "[in order to meet the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that 'the issues in the class action
that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole,
... predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof."'
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.
2000)). Importantly, "[tihe predominance requirement calls only for
predominance, not exclusivity, of common questions." Shelter Realty Corp. v.
Allied Maint. Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
48. See, e.g., Stetser v. TAP Pharmaceutical Prods. Inc., 598 S.E.2d 570, 581
(N.C. App. 2004) (explaining that "[tihe trial court's application of North
Carolina law to a nationwide plaintiff class will pass constitutional muster only
if the substantive laws of each of these states does not materially differ from
North Carolina's law on plaintiffs' claims"); Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914
S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming multi-state class certification
under Texas law, explaining that "[n]o one will be injured in applying Texas law
... if it is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this
suit"); Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 628 A.2d 1080, 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (reversing order denying certification of a multi-state fraud and
fraudulent concealment class-action claim under New Jersey law, explaining
that "[tihe additional problems with possible multi-state consumer fraud or
other statutory claims raise manageable questions. The problems inherent in
certifying a class presenting conflict of laws issues are not unsurmountable
[sic] . ..").
49. Under some states' consumer-protection laws, the plaintiff must be a
state resident for the statute to apply. See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
835 N.E.2d 801, 854 (Ill. 2005) ("We conclude, therefore, that the out-of-state
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predominance argument and theory for obtaining nationwide
class certification would be that, under Shutts's second prong
applying Ohio substantive law-Ohio's Consumer-Protection
Act-neither violates due process nor creates fundamental
unfairness because defendant is headquartered in Ohio,
defendant's scheme was hatched and implemented in Ohio,
and defendant profited from its fraud in Ohio.5 ° Importantly
(and germane to this Article), when making either argument
plaintiff would invoke all Ohio state-court, class-action
decisions applying Ohio substantive law to multi-state
classes. And defendant, of course, would cite all Ohio state-
court, class-action decisions refusing to apply Ohio
substantive law to multi-state classes.
But in today's CAFA-nated world, defendant would
immediately remove plaintiffs state-court, multi-state, class-
action lawsuit to federal court.51 Once there, a major issue at
plaintiffs in this case have no cognizable cause of action under the Consumer
Fraud Act."); Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002)
("[T]o qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a consumer
must occur in New York.").
50. See, e.g., Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439
(Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming class certification under Florida consumer-
protection law where "[tihe trial court found that Florida had significant
connections, [such as aippellant's principal place of business [was] in Florida,..
• appellant's U.S. business operations [were] controlled and carried out from
[Florida,] any overages were kept by appellant in Fort Lauderdale[, thus]
indicati[ng] the parties' mutual expectation that Florida law would apply");
Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461, 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining that "if
the trial court found that Illinois ha[d] significant contact to the claims asserted
by each class member, the court could apply Illinois substantive law to this
multi-state class action[, and that tihis finding would ensure that the
application of Illinois law [was] neither arbitrary nor unfair").
51. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, "any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). Furthermore, according to CAFA,
"[t]he amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced
on or after the date of enactment of this Act[, February 18, 2005]." Pub. L. No.
109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 14 (2005). Consequently, since CAFA's enactment,
defendants have routinely begun removing state-court, class-action cases to
federal court where original jurisdiction, pursuant to CAFA, is claimed to exist.
See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming district
court's remand order where defendant removed plaintiffs pre-CAFA lawsuit,
explaining that a state lawsuit "commences" when it begins in state court, not
when the defendant removes it to federal court.); Brill v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing district court's order
denying remand to state court following removal under CAFA where plaintiffs
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class certification would be to what extent, if any, the federal
judge could call upon or properly be influenced by Ohio state-
court decisions considering class certification under Ohio Rule
23 and applying (or not) Ohio's substantive law to multi-state
classes. After all, class certification is a procedural question
under Federal Rule 23, and, as such, the U.S. Supreme
Court's Erie decision,52 generally directing that federal courts
in diversity cases (which multi-state class actions are) must
apply state substantive law but are directed to apply federal
procedural law, 3 arguably requires the federal judge to
consider only federal jurisprudence.
But can't it be suggested that determining whether a
particular state's substantive law applies to class-wide claims
is a substantive question to be decided under the forum state's
jurisprudence, meaning that federal judges may consider and
apply state law, whether the forum state's or some other's,
when deciding predominance under Federal Rule 23?"4 If so,
"suit was commenced after February 18, 2005, the Act's effective date."); Bush v.
Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's
order remanding case to state court following removal under CAFA because
"[b]y its own terms, the Act became effective for all actions that 'commenced on
or after' February 18, 2005."); Dinkel v. GMC, 400 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292 (D. Me.
2005) (denying plaintiffs motion for remand since plaintiffs lawsuit, in which
he failed to serve defendants all defendants within ninety days of his pre-CAFA
complaint's filing, was not considered as having "commenced" pre-CAFA:
"Under Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure, however, filing the complaint alone
does not necessarily 'commence' the lawsuit. That filing 'commences' the
lawsuit only if process is served within 90 days thereafter. Otherwise (i.e., if
more than 90 days passes), the lawsuit does not 'commence' until service of
process occurs. . . ."); Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Scripsolutions, No. CIV.A.
2:05cv370-A, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24821, at *12-13 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2005)
(remanding pre-CAFA case to state court even though plaintiff filed its
amended complaint after CAFA's enactment, explaining that "the Amended and
Restated Complaint would relate back [and that] this case was commenced for
purposes of the CAFA before the effective date of the CAFA").
52. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. Id. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State"). See
infra Part V (discussing Erie and its progeny).
54. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Our inquiry
into the predomination analysis must[, in part,] be on the substantive elements
of plaintiffs' cause of action and inquire into the proof necessary for the various
elements."); Murray v. America's Mortgage Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03 C
6816, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11751, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005) ("The
predominance factor requires consideration of the substantive elements of the
plaintiffs' cause of action."); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660,
691 (N.D. Ga. 2003) ("[The Court will begin its predominance analysis by
setting forth the elements of the substantive law for each cause of action."); In
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might the fact that a federal court is considering what state's
substantive law to use render this inquiry substantive despite
the court's larger procedural analysis? Thus, might a federal
court's procedural class-action analysis be permitted a
"substantive twist," specifically where predominance under
Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (i.e., which state's or states' substantive
law should apply) is concerned? And if so, does considering
state-court, class-action decisions run afoul of Erie, or is
making a substantive inquiry when conducting a larger
procedural one a necessary part of a new CAFA-nated, class-
action analysis?55
re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 263 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[The
predominance inquire also requires the identification of the elements of the
substantive law at issue."); Ploog v. Homeside Lending, Inc., No. 00 C 6391,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15697, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2001) ("In determining
whether the predominance requirement has been met, the 'Court considers the
substantive elements of the Plaintiffs cause of action, the proof necessary for
the various elements, and the manageability of the trial on these issues."');
Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 700 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("[The
piredominance requirement focuses on the substantive aspects of class
members' legal claims. . . ."); Panache Broad. v. Richardson Elecs., No. 90 C
6400, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14462, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995) ("[A court
should begin the predominance inquiry by focusing on the substantive elements
of the cause of action, and then examine the evidence necessary to prove those
elements in order to determine whether common or individual questions are
likely to predominate in the litigation.").
55. Perhaps state-court Rule 23 decisions considering what state's
substantive law to apply are sufficiently procedural such that they can
necessarily be used according to Erie, just like state courts frequently used
Federal Rule 23 decisions when considering class certification under their state
Rule 23 or equivalent procedural statute. See, e.g., Sw. Refining Co., Inc. v.
Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000) ("[Texas Rule 42] is patterned after
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and
authorities interpreting current federal class action requirements are
persuasive authority."); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v.
Cole, 896 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he federal cases on the issue
are persuasive, because Florida [Rlule 1.220, which governs certification of a
class, is modeled on [Flederal [Rlule 23, which is interpreted in the above
federal cases."); In re Logan, No. 47301-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 475, at *11
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2002) ("Federal Rule 23 and Washington CR 23 are
the same. 'thus, federal cases interpreting the analogous federal provision are
highly persuasive.'"); CSX Transp. v. Clark, 646 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) ("[Flederal class action cases decided under Federal Rule 23 are
persuasive authority for Indiana Courts interpreting Ind. Trial Rule 23.");
Sisters of St. Mary v. Aaer Sprayed Insulation, No. 85CV5952, 1987 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 4440, at *11 n.8 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1987) ("our courts have relied
on Federal Rule 23 and federal cases addressing it to approve of procedural
determinations made by Wisconsin trial courts in class action cases."); Perry v.
Meek, 618 P.2d 934, 940 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Ilnsofar as the issues under
consideration arise from provisions of 12 O.S. Supp. 1979 §§13-18, which are
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IV. THE FALLACY OF RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON STATE
CHOICE-OF-LAW JURISPRUDENCE
When attempting to resolve this conundrum, federal
courts might be inclined to rely principally, if not exclusively,
on state choice-of-law jurisprudence and the U.S. Supreme
Court's Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.56
holding. The Klaxon Court considered whether, in a diversity
case, federal courts must follow conflict-of-laws rules
prevailing in the forum state.57 Explaining that Erie's scope
extended to the field of conflict of laws,58 the Klaxon Court
ruled that "[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by the
[sitting] federal court ... must conform to those prevailing in
[the forum state's] state courts."59
Where federal courts, pre-CAFA, were asked to consider
multi-state class certification-because, for instance,
diversity existed and the requested injunctive relief was
considered as meeting or exceeding the jurisdictional amount
in controversy6 -federal courts, as first suggested by Hague
actually similar to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the
federal case law on those points is instructive persuasive authority in this
forum."); Williams v. Motorists Ins. Corp., No. 76 CA 148, 1977 Ohio App.
LEXIS 10012, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1977) ("[A]s to the law that would
apply in the instant case, it is helpful to resort to federal cases dealing with a
similar rule, Federal Rule 23."). This query, though, is one for another article.
56. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
57. Id. at 494.
58. Id. at 496.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining that federal jurisdiction exists in cases where "it is apparent
that injunctive relief is the primary relief sought."); Steinberg v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 67, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[Tlhe injunctive relief sought
by the plaintiff furnishes the basis for federal jurisdiction."); Jackson v. Johnson
& Johnson, Inc., No. 01-2113 DA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22329, at *15 (D. Tenn.
Apr. 3, 2001) (denying plaintiffs' motion for remand because they "were seeking
injunctive relief in the form of the medical monitoring program[, and tihe
amount in controversy, therefore, was measured by the value of the object of
litigation."); Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6974, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) ("The Court finds that plaintiff and
the alleged class members have a common and undivided interest in the
injunctive and declaratory relief sought herein. Therefore, the jurisdictional
amount requirement is satisfied if their interests collectively exceed $50,000.");
Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475, 479 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
("In a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation. The value of the medical
monitoring program sought by plaintiffs is well in excess of $50,000, even using
defendants' figures." (citation omitted)).
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and later by Shutts, sometimes invoked Klaxon to conclude
that the forum state's choice-of-law rules applied, pursuant to
which these courts could blithely rule that one state's
substantive law applied to the controversy:
If a conflict of law is found to exist in this [multi-state,
class-action] litigation, this Court, sitting in diversity, is
bound to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state,
New York. In the event that a conflict of substantive law
[does] exist ... New York courts apply a "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contracts" test . . . and apply "the law of
the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the
litigation."61
But a traditional choice-of-law analysis and decision that
predominance is satisfied under the forum state's substantive
law fails to consider the larger procedural overlay that courts
must appreciate when analyzing a procedural question under
Federal Rule 23. A shorthand analytical approach, per
Klaxon, ignores Erie and its progeny's generally understood
directive to consider federal law with respect to procedural
matters and state law with respect to substantive matters;
although, a Federal Rule 23 predominance analysis may well
be a substantive matter, just not entirely.62
Moreover, conducting solely a Hague/Shutts analysis
and determining "that for a State's substantive law to be
61. Steinberg, 224 F.R.D. at 78 (suggesting that applying New York
substantive law to multi-state claims when conducting Federal Rule 23's
predominance inquiry was appropriate). See also Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The significant contacts with New York
state in this [multi-state, class-action] case satisfy Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit under Shutts."); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (finding selection of forum law constitutional in securities litigation
where defendant "Pennsylvania ha[d] the most significant relationship ... since
the financial statements alleged to contain the misstatements emanated from
Pennsylvania."); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987)
("[Ilt is clear that New Jersey law applie[d] to the questions raised by Count V
of the Complaint" because defendant's principle place of business was New
Jersey and its alleged misrepresentations originated there.); In re Lilco Sec.
Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("After Shutts it is not at all certain
that application in this case of one state's law is unconstitutional and in the
event New York is applied, it may be that New York choice of law rules direct
the application of New York law."); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415,
431 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (The "court... entertain[ed] a presumption that California
law... control[ed the] case" because defendant maintained its principle place of
business there, issued securities there, and the purchasers' acceptances were
directed there.).
62. See generally cases cited in note 54.
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selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State
must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,"63  also
undermines, indeed entirely neglects, any meaningful
procedural analysis. Any federal court merely contemplating
the substantive choice-of-law issues raised by Hague and
Shutts, while ignoring the procedural realities that a Rule 23
predominance analysis necessarily engenders, similarly
ignores the Supreme Court's long-standing Erie doctrine and
instead favors another analytically short-shrift choice-of-law
approach when considering multi-state, class-action litigation
and a single state law's substantive application.
V. ERIE AND ITS PROGENY
Examining Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins' and its progeny
provides some better and more complete guidance concerning
federal courts' ability to invoke state-law jurisprudence when
considering multi-state, class-action claims and applying a
single state's substantive law.
A. The Erie Doctrine
Appreciating Erie first requires an explanation and
understanding of the U.S. Supreme Court's Swift v. Tyson 65
decision. In Swift, the Court held that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction in general jurisprudential
matters were not required to apply the forum state's
unwritten laws. Rather, federal courts could exercise
independent judgment as to what the state's common law was
or should have been:
[T]he true interpretation of the 34th section [of the 1789
Judiciary Act] limited its application to state laws strictly
local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state,
and the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial
in their nature and character. It never has been supposed
63. Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13.
64. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply,
to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and
permanent operation, as, for example, to the construction
of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and
especially to questions of general commercial law, where
the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like
functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general
reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition
of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule
furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern
the case. And we have not now the slightest difficulty in
holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and
construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local
usages of the character before stated, and does not extend
to contracts and other instruments of a commercial
nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to
be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in
the general principles and doctrines of commercial
jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local
tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and will
receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this
court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up
and governed.66
The Erie Court reworked its Swift holding considerably.
In Erie, an object protruding from an Erie freight train
injured Tompkins, a Pennsylvania resident, while he was
walking in Pennsylvania along a commonly used beaten
footpath that ran alongside the railroad tracks.6 7 When
Tompkins brought his claim in New York federal court,
because Erie was incorporated there,6" Erie contended that
under Pennsylvania law, "its duty to Tompkins was no
greater than that owed to a trespasser."69 For Tompkins's
part, he "denied that any such rule had been established by
the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts; and contended that,
since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the
railroad's duty and liability [was] to be determined in federal
66. Id. at 18-19.
67. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 70.
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courts as a matter of general law," which favored Tompkins.7"
"The question for decision," explained the Court, was
"whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall
now be disapproved."7'
The Erie Court explained that the Swift doctrine had
exposed serious political and social defects, that Swift's
expected benefits had never accrued, and that persistent state
courts' questions concerning common law had prevented
uniformity:
[T]he mischievous results of the doctrine had become
apparent. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was
conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination
in state courts against those not citizens of the State.
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the
unwritten "general law" vary according to whether
enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the
right should be determined was conferred upon the non-
citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal
protection of the law. In attempting to promote
uniformity of law throughout the United States, the
doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration
of the law of the State.72
The Court added that Justice Holmes, in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co.," had articulated the "fallacy"74 underlying
Swift's rule:
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is "a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute," that federal courts have the power to use their
judgment as to what the rules of common law are; and
that in the federal courts "the parties are entitled to an
independent judgment on matters of general law":
"But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 69.
72. Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
73. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
74. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
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The common law so far as it is enforced in a State,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have
been in England or anywhere else....
"The authority and only authority is the State, and if
that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
[whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court]
should utter the last word."75
Accordingly, the Erie Court overruled Swift and held that
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. . . .There is no federal general common
law."76 Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the only duty owed to
Tompkins, a trespasser, "was to refrain from wilful [sic] or
wanton injury. 77
More generally, Erie is understood to mean that "federal
courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of
'substantive' law, are bound by state court decisions as well
as state statutes."78 But later Supreme Court decisions
considering other federal/state-law quandaries transformed
Erie's lesson and reshaped Erie's mandate. And these later
Erie-related cases-Erie's progeny-help elucidate Erie's
ultimate utility when conducting a CAFA-nated, choice-of-law
analysis.
B. Erie's Transformation: Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
Of Erie's progeny, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York79 offers
perhaps the most valuable analytical succor, at least for this
Article's purpose. In York, plaintiff-noteholder brought a
class-action lawsuit in federal court based on diversity of
citizenship. 0 Plaintiff alleged breach of trust by defendant
for defendant's alleged failure to protect her and other
noteholders' interests.1  The district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment, in which
75. Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532-36).
76. Id. at 78.
77. Id. at 80.
78. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
79. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).




defendant argued that the state statute of limitations had
precluded plaintiffs lawsuit.8 2 The Second Circuit reversed,
explaining that the district court was "not required to apply
the State statute of limitations that ... govern[ed] like suits
in the courts of a State where the federal court [was] sitting
even though the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction [was]
diversity of citizenship."83
The Supreme Court was "concern[ed] with the [appellate
court's] holding that the federal courts in a suit like [that] one
[were] not bound by local law."' As this concern specifically
affected the state statute of limitations, the Court believed
the case "reduce[d] itself to the narrow question whether,
when no recovery could be had in a State court because the
action [was] barred by the statute of limitations, a federal
court in equity [could] take cognizance of the suit because
there [was] diversity of citizenship between the parties." 5
The Court's analysis underscored Erie's objective to
ensure that where a federal court is exercising diversity
jurisdiction, the litigation's outcome in federal court should be
substantially the same as if tried in state court:
Is the outlawry [or endorsement], according to State law,
of a claim created by the States a matter of "substantive
rights" to be respected by a federal court of equity when
that court's jurisdiction is dependent on the fact that there
is a State-created right, or is such statute of "a mere
remedial character," . . . which a federal court may
disregard? 6
Withdrawing from Erie's substantive versus procedural
construct, the Court explained that "[i]atters of 'substance'
and matters of 'procedure' are much talked about in the books
as though they define[] a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But of course 'substance' and
'procedure' are the same keywords to very different
problems."87 The Court therefore reformulated the question it
82. Id.
83. Id. at 101.
84. Id.
85. York, 326 U.S. at 107.
86. Id. at 107-08.
87. Id. at 108. See also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 ("[A] federal court system..
carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
20061 587
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
had considered in Erie, focusing no longer on the substantive-
procedural distinction but rather marking the emergence of
its "outcome determinative test":
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations
is deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The
question is whether such a statute concerns merely the
manner and the means by which a right to recover, as
recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such
statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect
that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it
significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal
court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same
parties in a State court?88
The Court considered it "immaterial whether statutes of
limitation [were] characterized either as 'substantive' or
'procedural,"' 9 as Erie never endeavored to formulate
scientific terminology. Rather, Erie expressed a policy
touching vitally on the judicial power's proper distribution
between state and federal courts. ° And despite lower courts'
sometimes slavish adherence to nomenclature, Erie's intent
was to ensure the same result in state and federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction, not to entangle courts with
analytical or terminological niceties:
[TIhe intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where
a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub
of the policy that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is
that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a
State court a block away should not lead to a substantially
different result.91
A federal tribunal, explained the Court, does not afford
out-of-state litigants another body of law.92 Rather, state law
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.").




92. Id. at 112.
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is the source of substantive rights enforced by a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction:
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not
from the United States but from one of the States. When,
because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, such a
right is enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court,
the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times,
naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems
are not identic. But since a federal court adjudicating a
State-created right solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only
another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it
substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by
the State.9 3
In keeping with its purpose to avoid federal courts
reaching different results than state courts, the Court ruled
that the state statute of limitations applied to plaintiffs
claim.94
C. York's "Outcome-Determinative" Test Modified: Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
The Court modified its outcome-determinative test
thirteen years later in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.95 The question on remand in Byrd was who
should decide the factual issue of whether plaintiff was an
employee or independent contractor-the judge or the jury?96
Under state law, the judge decided this question, while under
federal law, the jury decided it. The Court reiterated Erie's
directive that "federal courts in diversity cases must respect
the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the
state courts."97 It therefore examined state law to determine
whether the particular judge versus jury issue was "bound up
with these rights and obligations in such a way that its
application in the federal court [was] required."9"
93. Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added).
94. See York, 326 U.S. at 112.
95. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
96. Id. at 533.
97. Id. at 535.
98. Id.
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The Court first reiterated York's outcome-determinative
test and acknowledged that this test broadened Erie:
[C]ases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to the
effect that the federal courts should conform as near as
may be-in the absence of other considerations-to state
rules even of form and mode where the state rules may
bear substantially on the question whether the litigation
would come out one way in the federal court and another
way in the state court if the federal court failed to apply a
particular local rule.99
The Court then withdrew slightly from York's test,
explaining that under certain conditions federal law trumped
state law:
[T]here are affirmative countervailing considerations at
work here. The federal system is an independent system
for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke
its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system
is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it
distributes trial functions between judge and jury and,
under the influence-if not the command--of the Seventh
Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of
fact to the jury. The policy of uniform enforcement of
state-created rights and obligations cannot in every case
exact compliance with a state rule-not bound up with
rights and obligations-which disrupts the federal system
of allocating functions between judge and jury. Thus the
inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury
decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the
state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that
the litigation should not come out one way in the federal
court and another way in the state court. 100
The Court believed that the federal court in Byrd should
not have followed the state rule because it "[could not] be
[disputed] that there is a strong federal policy against
allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in
the federal courts."' 1 As an additional basis for its decision,
the Court added that, with respect to the litigation's
potentially different outcome based on "whether the issue of
immunity [was] decided by a judge or jury,"'0 2 it did not
99. Id. at 536-37 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 537-38 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
101. Byrd, 360 U.S. at 538.
102. Id. at 539. If plaintiff was considered an employee, he was barred from
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"think the likelihood of a different result [was] so strong as to
require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed
factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of
uniformity of outcome."103
This wrinkle to York's outcome-determinative test
requires federal courts to weigh the policies behind the
relevant federal and state rules in determining whether a
substantial possibility exists that different results will occur
under federal law. Thus, if the state practice reflects a weak
state policy-one "not bound up" with the underlying state
statute-the federal practice reflects a strong policy-like the
Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee-and if no
substantial possibility exists that different results will occur
by using federal law, then the federal practice is preferred.
D. A Return to York. Hanna v. Plumer
Seven years after Byrd, the Court swung back Erie and
York's way in Hanna v. Plumer.10 4  In Hanna, the Court
considered whether to require "service of process . . .in the
manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule
4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.""'
Synthesizing the preceding cases, the Court again
acknowledged Erie's rule that "federal courts sitting in
diversity cases, when deciding questions of 'substantive' law,
are bound by state court decisions as well as state
statutes." °6 It clarified that under York, "Erie-type problems
were not to be solved by reference to any traditional or
common-sense substance-procedure distinction. "107 As the
Court had explained in Byrd, York's outcome-determinative
test "was never intended to serve as a talisman."0 Instead,
York required that "choices between state and federal law are
to be made not by application of any automatic, 'litmus paper'
criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying
suing defendant because the workers compensation laws provided him an
exclusive remedy. See id. at 527.
103. Id. at 540 (footnote omitted).
104. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
105. Id. at 461.
106. Id. at 465.
107. Id. at 465-66.
108. Id. at 466-67 (citation omitted).
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the Erie rule."10 9
Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), the
Court reiterated that the natural difference between federal
and state courts ought not substantively affect a claim just
because the claim is pending in federal court. "Erie and its
offspring," explained the Court, "cast no doubt on the long-
recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules
for federal courts even though some of those rules will
inevitably differ from comparable state rules."10 Rather,
federal courts' natural "housekeeping rules" should not affect
the essence of claims brought in federal court, and federal
courts should avoid inequitably administering state
substantive laws merely because diversity exists and the
claims reside in federal court.
VI. FEDERAL COURTS' FREEDOM TO CONSIDER STATE-COURT,
CLASS-ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
How does all this affect whether federal courts, when
considering multi-state class certification under Federal Rule
23 pursuant to a single state's substantive law, may rely on
state-court decisions applying a single state's substantive
law? After all, multiple state-law decisions exist upon which
federal judges can potentially draw when considering the
multi-state, class-certification issues that state-court judges
had previously decided for years."'
Given that Federal Rule 23 is, of course, a procedural
rule, analyzing this question exclusively under Erie
encourages solely applying federal decisions when deciding
class certification. But as we know, class certification,
particularly when considering a single state law's substantive
application under Federal Rule 23's predominance
requirement, isn't entirely a procedural undertaking-various
courts' Klaxon analyses, which analyze and apply states'
substantive laws, confirm this. 12
109. Id. at 467 (citation and footnotes omitted).
110. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.
111. See supra note 29 (mentioning pre-CAFA multi-state, class-action suits
brought in state courts).
112. See, e.g., Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 452 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2001) (analyzing substantive, state choice-of-law question under Klaxon);
Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
(same); Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir.
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Instead, state laws undeniably create the claims upon
which most multi-state, class-action lawsuits are based,
whether involving consumer fraud,"3  deceptive trade
practices," 4 breach of contract,"5  unjust enrichment,"1 6 or
1987) (same); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 60 n.10
(3rd Cir. 1982) (same).
113. See, e.g., Spector v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 358, 359 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (class-action, consumer-fraud claim against Toys "R" Us involving claim
"where gift receipts were presented upon an item being returned, the person
presenting it would receive an amount less than that paid for the item"); Small
v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 252 A.D.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (class-action,
consumer-fraud case for allegedly "deceiv[ing consumers] into becoming
smokers because defendants lied about nicotine's addictive properties while
secretly manipulating the nicotine content of their products in order to addict
consumers"); Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 619-20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("[Cllass action complaint . . . regarding charges for
incompleted calls .... ").
114. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001)
(class-action, deceptive-trade-practices claim alleging that Bally's "was liable
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for unconscionable conduct and
for representing that [its member] agreement[s] conferred rights and
obligations prohibited by law"); Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher,
898 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) (class-action, deceptive-trade-practices
claim "alleg[ing] that Chase ha[d] a deliberate policy of failing to post mortgage
payments on the same date they were received so that it can charge
unwarranted late fees"); J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d 820, 821 (Fla.
Ct. App. 2004) (class-action, deceptive-trade-practices claim "alleging that
Smucker's Simply 100% Fruit products [didn't] contain 100% fruit").
115. See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E. 801, 811 (Ill.
2005) (class-action, breach-of-contract claim against State Farm disputing "the
propriety of State Farm's uniform practice of specifying the use of non-OEM
crash parts to repair its policyholders' cars in every instance in which such
cheaper parts are available"); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148,
154 (Cal. 2005) (class-action, breach-of-contract claim against Discover Bank for
allegedly "breach[ing] its cardholder agreement by imposing a late fee of
approximately $29 on payments that were received on the payment due date,
but after Discover Bank's undisclosed 1:00 p.m. 'cut-off time'"); Carolla v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. A03-0021, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1109, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2003) (class-action, breach-of-contract claim "asserting that the
value of [plaintiffs] car was diminished as a result of being in an accident and
that American Family's Minnesota Family Car Policy covered that diminished-
value loss").
116. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Ford Motor Co., 909 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. Ct. App.
2005) (class-action, unjust-enrichment claim "alleging [that plaintifli overpaid
for his 1998 Ford Explorer beyond its true value due to the Defendant's
concealment of a design defect"); Balt. Football Club, Inc. v. Superior Court, 171
Cal. App. 3d 352, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (class-action, unjust-enrichment
action where class asserted "claims of unjust enrichment from the use of season
ticket purchase money during a year in which games were cancelled due to the
strike"); Boldt v. Correspondence Mgmt., 726 A.2d 975, 977 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (class-action, unjust-enrichment claim for "alleged photocopying
overcharges by health care providers").
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some other state-law statutory or common-law theory. In this
manner, state laws and their application cannot help but to
"significantly affect the result of a litigation," "' since federal
lawsuits based on diversity jurisdiction necessarily involve
state-law claims. Accordingly, neglecting state law, either
substantive or sometimes procedural, would preclude federal
courts from fully and properly deciding multi-state, class-
action claims under a single state's substantive law.
Erie made clear that state substantive law had a
significant place in federal courts' legal analyses. Indeed,
York confirmed that federal courts may not disregard state
law as explicated in state-court decisions. After all, if Erie's
intent was to ensure the same substantive results in federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction as in state courts, and
state law is the source from which all substantive rights
enforced by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction
derive, then no more authoritative source for state law exists
than state-court decisions, including state-court decisions
considering a single state law's substantive application under
state class-action rules.
Moreover, considering state-court, class-action decisions
advances Erie and its progeny's directive that a lawsuit's
outcome remains substantially the same despite the court in
which the lawsuit is pending. And although Byrd scaled back
York's outcome-determinative test, explaining that uniformly
applying state-created rights and obligations (here, state-law,
class-action decisions interpreting and applying state
substantive law) need not apply where these state laws are
"not bound up with the [state] rights and obligations" 18
sought to be invoked, state-court, class-action decisions can
fairly be considered as bound up with-or essential to-state
class-action rules' fundamental purposes since, in light of
these rules' purposes, state-court, class-action decisions
considered, interpreted, and applied these state class-action
rules from the time these rules were enacted. Moreover,
acceding to state-court decisions doesn't risk disrupting or
otherwise offending the federal system, as occurred in Byrd
since almost all state class-action statutes mirror Federal
117. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).




Viewed from the opposite end, using federal class-action
decisions alone is not so bound up in Federal Rule 23's
predominance analysis-like, for example, the right to a jury
trial is in the Constitution 12 0-that state-court jurisprudence
considering predominance should be abandoned, especially
considering the near, if not complete, identity between most
states' class-action rules and Federal Rule 23.121 To be sure,
no "strong federal policy"122 exists against federal courts using
state-court, class-action decisions when analyzing the
identical predominance inquiries and single state law's
classwide application that had principally been, until
recently, considered in state courts. And a predominance
inquiry's outcome may differ based on the influence of the
state-court decisions invoked versus the comparably limited
federal authority on this newly developing subject, which is
yet another basis Byrd suggested for invoking state
substantive law and, accordingly, state-court decisions.
As suggested by Hanna, the fact that CAFA has
federalized essentially all interstate, class-action claims
should not substantively affect these claims' determination.
Although state and federal courts are not identical, federal
courts should avoid ignoring or inequitably administering
state laws merely because CAFA now confers original federal-
court, subject-matter jurisdiction on interstate, class-action
lawsuits. Rather, federal courts' adherence to state-court,
class-certification jurisprudence advances Erie and its
progeny's age-old pronouncements and helps ensure that
federal judges will decide newly federalized state-court claims
substantially the same in federal court-their new forum-as
state-court judges had traditionally decided these claims in
state court.
Finally, as a practical matter, absent state-law
consideration, federal courts sitting in diversity-many of
119. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 23; ARK. R. CIV. P. 23; FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.220; IND.
R. TRIAL P. 23; KY. R. CIV. P. 23.01, 23.02; ME. R. CIV. P. 23; MASS. R. CIv. P. 23;
MICH. CT. R. 3.501; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.01, 23.02; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 901;
OHIO R. Civ. P. 23; PA. R. Civ. P. 1702; TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.01, 23.02; TEX. R. Civ.
P. 42; VT. R. Civ. P. 23 (mirroring Federal Rule 23 and its prerequisites).
120. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 540.
121. See supra note 119 (listing various state class-action rules that mirror
Federal Rule 23).
122. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
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which will imminently be considering this issue for the first
time-will lack significant guidance concerning applying a
single state's substantive law to multi-state claims. To
abandon years of well-developed, state-court jurisprudence
forces busy and newly challenged federal judges to analyze
this issue from a largely blank federal slate, surely an
undesirable consequence 123 and one that hardly comports
with the judiciary's obvious and fundamental interest to
adjudicate claims-especially class-action claims-
judiciously, efficiently, and economically. 124
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether to apply a single state's substantive law when
considering predominance under Federal Rule 23 necessarily
traverses the substantive and procedural divide, and this
query's unique nature evokes Erie's fundamental essence.
Examining Erie and its progeny alongside Klaxon, Hague,
and Shutts demonstrates that federal courts may, in fact,
consider state-court decisions when deciding multi-state class
certification alleging a single state law's substantive
application. Indeed, considering state-court jurisprudence
respects Erie's original mandate while embracing its
progeny's amplifications and nuances.
And although this issue is merely one of the many still to
come from CAFA's recent enactment, as federal, multi-state,
class-action lawsuits move toward class certification, this
issue will surely receive significant attention. Erie and its
progeny, although never contemplating their invocation in
this new world order, nonetheless demonstrate the
appropriateness of invoking state-law, class-action
123. See, e.g., Local Union No. 12004, USW v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 77
(1st Cir. 2004) (expressing discomfort with deciding an issue "on a blank slate");
Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing the
importance of precedent so as to avoid deciding issues "on a tabula rasa").
124. See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 585 (5th Cir. 1982) ("District
courts are entitled to manage their cases with the aim of conducting litigation
efficiently."); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, No. 94-CV-0486E(F), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5589, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1997) ("This Court believes that a
logical-indeed laudable-desire to litigate their claims as efficiently as
possible-and not due to 'undue vexatiousness'-motivated the plaintiffs to
bring their motion."); Gabelli v. Sikes Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4904 (JMC), 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17015, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) ("[Tlhe desire to avoid
piecemeal litigation and promote judicial economy are concerns that strongly
support the issuance of a stay.").
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jurisprudence in federal class-certification proceedings
considering a single state law's substantive application.
Federal courts considering multi-state class certification
under Federal Rule 23 may therefore sit back and drink in
state-court, class-action jurisprudence involving, analyzing,
and determining single state laws' substantive application in
today's CAFA-nated world.

